THE New Republic

The Illness of Secretary Dulles

Editorial

Page 5

TIME-Study

Accuracy in a Weekly Newsmagazine

By BEN H. BAGDIKIAN

Negotiating on Berlin . . . . . *Eugene Rostow*

Adventures of the Soul . . . . *R. A. Scott-James*

From "Candor" to "Whe[illegible]ties" . *E. G. Posniak*

Mother India . . . . . *Stanley Kauffmann*

FEBRUARY 23, 1959

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Washington Wire

The Clock Ticks On

ANNE WHEATON'S drawn face told the whole story before she ever began reading Eisenhower's drab statement at Walter Reed Army Hospital. . . . First Sherman Adams; now Dulles. . . . Each an Eisenhower idol, each hoarding delegated authority, each at last leaving the lonely President lonelier. Troubles haunt the player at Burning Tree! Well, who wants to take over the job now and juggle six years of unresolved problems with stricken Dulles looking over his shoulder? Come, speak up, volunteers, the world's clock ticks on.

Happy Am I

THE FLAG isn't red, white and blue in Washington; the public ceremonial flag is red, white, blue and gold. The gold fringe attached to the tidy old-fashioned banner you and I used to know is a modern symbol—a sign of progress. The gold stands for solvency, for fiscal responsibility, for free enterprise, for putting a balanced budget before adequate classrooms. When Wall Street pledges allegiance to the flag, we suppose it salutes the Gold Fringe.

These irascible thoughts were provoked last week, while noting the 4-color flag on its stand behind the left shoulder of Health-Education-Welfare Secretary Flemming, as he announced his new aid-to-education bill. As you may have guessed, we didn't think much of the bill. It is the smallest offer the Administration has yet made. Flemming unveiled it glowingly.

Maybe the Secretary was conscious of the two motion picture cameras boring in on him at the press conference at No. 5542, North Building. He certainly threw himself into the affair, alternately bewailing the children's lot, and supporting the President's budget. Classroom shortages make an immediate emergency, he said; education is "vitally related to national strength"; many communities "cannot meet their classroom needs"; "the children cannot wait." Having said that the children "cannot wait," Flemming quickly added that no new money would be available under the plan till June 30, 1960, and then only in states which passed complicated laws or changed their constitutions. The maximum Federal offer?—about $100 million a year ($2.5 billion over 25 years).

"Are you happy with the bill?" asked a doubtful reporter at the end.

Happy?—of course he was, said Flemming. He gave a great big smile registering his happiness.

Secretary Benson testified last week over in the House committee on Agriculture. The room was so packed there was hardly room to stand. Subject—surplus crops held in storage. The crowd seemed fascinated. The government is trying to sustain prices in a technological revolution. Everybody knows it can't go on, but it goes on. Economists liken it to trying to keep the price of ice cream cones at 15 cents by buying up all the cones that are offered, and storing them. There are 37 members of the House committee and each seemed to have a different solution.

Blame Benson

BENSON said the government is pushing research to develop cheaper crops at one end and trying to cut off output at the other. The government now has $9 billion invested in surplus crops, will have $10 billion in another year, and pays an estimated $1 billion annually for storage.

Benson has the exasperating sweet blandness of a Christian martyr. Many people find his patient, persistent, mildness almost intolerable. Hectoring chairman Harold Cooley (D, N.C.) started a mild pink, steamed up through a brick red and ended a bright magenta. Benson remained placid and Christian. For almost an hour Cooley battered the pile of feathers and finally burst out wrathfully, "I'm willing to give you any authority —except the authority you want!" The crowd's tension crashed into laughter. Benson looked around—mildly. Present subsidies, he explained calmly, chiefly benefit the big growers, not the little growers.

What's the answer? Mrs. Roosevelt left another conference here writing in her column, sadly, that "I did become convinced that the small family farm is on its way out. . . . The small, one-family, single unit . . . seems from the economic standpoint . . . not to be very practicable."

Prospect: Congress won't do much this year—will just let the problem grow and blame Benson.

Lincoln's Spell

THE SENATE marched over to the House to celebrate the 150th anniversary of Lincoln's birth and the black robed Supreme Court trooped in (some of the Southerners won't applaud them anymore). There were distinguished visitors like Henry Wallace, whose hair is a little whiter and the Vice Chancellor of Austria. (It was good to see Senator Neuberger back again.)

Music came from the US Army Band in the corridor, but the tunes were trite and distance spoiled their tone and timber. Movie star Fredric March read the Gettysburg Address with artful simplicity, and there was a stirring appreciation by white-haired Carl Sandburg (who is wearing his bangs longer this year).

But everything that Sandburg said (magnificent though it was) was said earlier in a choral by a group of cadets from the Coast Guard Academy. Young fellows they were, just about the age of Lincoln's troops. Just Civil War songs, sung softly and broodingly—"Tenting Tonight," "Dixie," "The Battle Hymn of the Republic." And suddenly one watched the moved and humbled audience of public figures down in the big hall yielding openly to the spell. Lincoln was there.

It was interesting to look down and feel the communion. Lincoln—or what we have deified as Lincoln—is a singularly noble embodiment of a nation's aspirations. When you can glance across and see a television operator dabbing his cheek in unashamed surrender to the scene you feel that there may be something worth saving about us after all.

T.R.B.

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THE WEEK 3

Abundant Opportunity; The Illness of Secretary Dulles; Who Are the Jobless?; New Soviet Workers; Stalemate in Algeria; Popular Education; Senator Mansfield on Our German Policy

ARTICLES 9

Time-Study by Ben H. Bagdikian
Negotiating a Berlin Settlement by Eugene Rostow

BOOKS 19

MOVIES 22

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Correspondence

► *The Schmeerkunst Controversy*

SIRS:

THE current Schmeerkunst examination continues (*NR*, Feb. 9). Two letters praise the good sense of *The New Republic's* stand and two others footnote the professional mumbo-jumbo quoted in Frank Getlein's article. It is as Arthur Symons observed some time

(Continued on page 23)

Abundant Opportunity

AS A RESULT of bumper wheat and corn crops the estimated value of surplus farm commodity stocks held by the federal government will soon reach an all-time high of $9 billion. And who will even guess when the end will be in sight? Farm groups searching for ways to broaden foreign outlets for accumulating US stocks of food and fiber pushed through the surplus disposal program (Public Law 480) in 1954, and Congress has renewed it three times. Although the program has included some famine relief grants ($1.1 billion) and barter deals for scarce ores through private trade channels ($900 million), the biggest single item has been the sale for foreign currencies of surpluses which were not selling in the regular dollar market. Two and one-half billion dollars worth of agricultural commodities had been sold abroad for foreign currencies as of the end of 1958.

The fact that the US sells the surpluses for local currencies is to the farm bloc simply an unfortunate temporary expedient incidental to getting rid of the stocks. But PL 480 has acquired an altogether different significance for the countries receiving the surpluses. The less-developed countries which are the principal recipients are short on food *and* dollars: thus the program has the special virtue of simultaneously easing local food scarcity (and price inflation) and releasing dollars for capital goods imports. Moreover, roughly half of the sale proceeds accruing to the US are reloaned to the recipient countries for US-approved economic development projects (the remainder is used for US local currency procurement, *e.g.*, in military aid programs, and for educational purposes such as the Fulbright student exchanges). What was designed purely and simply as a *disposal* program has become, in short, an important part of our foreign aid program.

This dual significance of PL 480 has long been apparent to some far-sighted aid officials and aid supporters who have doubted whether Congress would ever appropriate the large dollar sums needed for an effective US economic contribution to the less-developed countries, and who have seen in a redesigned PL 480 a means for marrying desperate necessity abroad with political reality at home—not to mention reconciling the paradox of US over-abundance in a hungry world. But farm bloc sentiment for a broadened PL 480 program did not crystallize until very recently. With Secretary Benson using the high cost of storing the surpluses as one of his main arguments against price supports, the farm groups are now unanimously pressing for a PL 480 program placed on a more permanent basis than the present year-to-year schedule. The Administration had been considering a special report on the possibilities in an expanded PL 480 program by Harvard agricultural economist John H. Davis when the political winds from Capitol Hill began to pick up velocity, and the result was an apparently last-minute decision to place "Food for Peace" in the President's farm message. But although the President has designated

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Secretary Benson "to explore anew with other surplus-producing nations all practical means of utilizing the various agricultural surpluses of each in the interest of reinforcing peace"—which might mean, in specific terms, a world conference of food ministry representatives later this year—the Administration has no immediate plan beyond renewing PL 480.

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In Congress, on the other hand, there are major legislative initiatives in the making. Rep. W. R. Poage (D, Tex.) has introduced an amendment providing for a 10-year surplus program on a loan basis with repayments in dollars over a period of up to 50 years. Senator Humphrey (D, Minn.) and Representative McGovern (D, S. Dak.) have introduced resolutions affirming Congressional support for a long-term surplus program "as an integral part of our foreign assistance," and Senator Humphrey is readying an omnibus bill which would, among other things, set up a peacetime agency comparable to the War Food Administration—thus giving the program administrative independence and, equally important politically, budgetary independence from the foreign aid and Agriculture appropriations. By attributing the cost of surplus disposal programs to some agency other than the Department of Agriculture, in the name of an objective other than farm price supports, Secretary Benson's misgivings about the high cost of surplus disposal (on top of supports) might be modified.

Senator Humphrey is, in our view, to be commended for his leadership on the surplus issue and his omnibus program will be studied with great interest. There are, however, very serious limitations inherent in any long-term program conceived essentially, as are *all* of the programs contemplated, in terms of loans. The less-developed countries are aware that the US does not know what to do with its abundance. Thus in this instance the often-mentioned preference of sensitive Asian governments for loans rather than grants is less weighty than their clear recognition that the US could quite painlessly make the surpluses available as grants. This becomes peculiarly important in the light of the enormous accumulations of local currencies by the US already taking place in the case of India, Pakistan and Israel—which together claimed more than half of the PL 480 surpluses in 1958—and of the profound and growing uneasiness inevitably resulting from that accumulation in these newly independent countries. As Matthew Kust, former legal advisor to US embassies in South Asia, pointed out in these pages in the case of India, rupees acquired by the US Government under PL 480 (and soft-currency development loan programs) might in the conceivable future exceed those held by the Government of India! The mere thought of this is politically explosive in India, which is now in the midst of a frenzied reappraisal of its economic, which is to say political, future. The main theme of Indian Communist propaganda is that the Nehru Government is mortgaging itself to Washington.

At present 48 percent of PL 480 sale proceeds in India are reloaned for US-approved economic development projects; another 15 percent goes for grants to non-development purposes (*e.g.*, education and health); 12 percent for US Embassy administrative expenses, and up to 25 percent for local currency loans to US business operations in India (under the so-called Cooley Amendment). Any substantially expanded PL 480 program would mean that the 48 percent allocated for economic development would become a larger and larger sum—looming larger and larger in relation to the totality of the Indian Government budget—and a sum increasingly hot to handle. Why, Indian leaders might well ask (and this is also true in Pakistan and other surplus-recipient countries), does not the US follow the precedent of the Marshall Plan? The Marshall Plan was a grant program and the counterpart funds in European currencies accumulated under the Plan belonged to the recipient governments. To be sure, provision was made in the program agreements for virtual US control over decisions as to how the funds were to be spent; but this would be easier for the recipient governments to justify to their peoples than direct control of large sums of the national currency by the US, with all of its implicit political influence.

The Davis Report now before the State Department recognizes this state of mind in the less-developed countries and recommends that the grant portion of PL 480 allocations be increased from 15 to 25 percent. In our view there is no reason why the increase should not extend to the 48 percent portion now being reloaned and perhaps in later years to the bulk of the proceeds.

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There is danger that in the absence of a clear definition of "Food for Peace" as something different from a bigger and better disposal program—perhaps restyled "Food for Economic Development"—some of the merit of the program may be canceled out. It may become an excuse for many Congressmen to vote against vital dollar aid appropriations (*e.g.*, for an expanded Development Loan Fund) while not having the saving grace of the grant authority so necessary in the light of political realities in the less-developed countries. The National Grange frankly urges the federal government to "use surplus agricultural commodities whenever practical instead of dollars as a means of aid and relief." What the farm belt politicians are perhaps afraid of is an isolationist rural reaction against "giveaways." But given the facts and some leadership we suspect that farmers could be won to a grant program. They have, after all, nothing to lose.

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The Illness of Secretary Dulles

FERVENT HOPES for a recovery as complete as possible in the melancholy circumstances spring not alone from sympathy for a stricken fellow human being, but from the depths of genuine respect for John Foster Dulles, so much of whose life over the past 50 years has been given to the nation. He has not spared himself. Nor has he ever deceived himself or the country about the worthlessness of unenforceable paper agreements with the Communists.

Yet it would be dissimulating to suggest that our admiration is unalloyed. The Secretary's appeasement of McCarthy did, as Joseph Alsop wrote, come "close to destroying the American foreign service." More important, his appearance of intransigence and his unimaginative handling of a variety of problems have been a drag on US diplomacy. A nation cannot emerge with credit from recurrent crises to which its only contribution is implacable suspicion of any and every new proposal on grounds of "appeasement" or "defeatism."

It has seemed to many who have criticized Mr. Dulles that the first and hardest requirement imposed upon US foreign policy is that it be animated by a vision of feasible goals: failure is inevitable for a policy that cannot enlist the support of not only our diverse and skeptical democratic society, but support throughout the non-Communist world.

Secretary Dulles' initial response to this requirement was to offer "liberation" as the alternative to the Truman-Acheson doctrine of "containment." The alternative badly overshot its mark. By taking too little account of the limits of American leadership, Dullesian diplomacy simultaneously aroused unjustified expectations and destructive fears. The Secretary thereupon swung all the way in the other direction. He sought through the threat of "massive retaliation" to capitalize on a transient military advantage with the apparent intent of either halting the course of history, or at least of arrogating to the US the right to determine in which channels history would be permitted to flow. When this strategy failed to produce all that was expected of it (significantly, when it failed to save the northern half of Vietnam from Communism), Mr. Dulles began to fluctuate between poles of his own. At the one extreme a reliance on nuclear military power persisted, accompanied by a largely defensive and negative military emphasis that called for extending mutual security treaties to areas where they had little relevance, and of unilateral security guarantees to countries that either did not want them or did not deserve them. This "pactomania" period began with a falsely conceived China policy and ended (may we hope?) with the recent fiasco of the Baghdad Pact.

From time to time during the same period (1954-1956), an opposite attraction drew the Secretary to insist that "law" rather than power was the vital ingredient: the US was said to be the authoritative voice of "world order." And so the pendulum swung from an over-militarized policy that terrorized our allies to a moralizing policy that bored them—except in the Suez affair directed *against* the most important of them.

Yet these extremes had in common the same fallacy: they presumed too much. Great influence is America's because of our industrial and military strength and because of the vigor exhibited in our economic and political institutions. But the world was never ours to order. If our nation had the power (such as a monopoly on long-range nuclear missiles) and were in fact sufficiently sure of its world mission, a Pax Americana might be possible in the short-run. But for lack of these, there is no alternative . . . and never has been . . . but to foster a collaborative diplomatic effort aimed at obtaining widest possible agreement, an effort in which the US contribution is major, but only partial.

The decline in our military power relative to that of the USSR seems to have had a salutary effect on Mr. Dulles. Stubbornness can be cherished when it is called for—and a degree of stubbornness on the part of the Secretary of State *has* been called for since the Russians began seeking to cash in on their new-found military strength. But at the same time, as the Secretary's reaction to the growing Berlin crisis demonstrated, his policy has not lately been limited to stubbornness. On the contrary, it had begun to exhibit an unwonted tendency to accommodation, primarily with our allies, but a tendency which also presents our adversaries with a challenge that is not exclusively an affront.

WE FULLY AGREE with those who hold that the Russian squeeze on Berlin presents the entire non-Communist world with its gravest peril since the Cold War began. The Russians have raised an issue that can mean life or death for the freedom of Western Europe. The West's best hope is to recapture the initiative by coming forward with new, reasonable proposals of its own, which is what Mr. Dulles seemed to be trying to do when he was stricken. Immediately ahead lie great dangers and opportunities as we explore new devices for assuring Berlin's freedom, for realizing the union of two Germanies and possibly achieving a pullback of Soviet military power from Europe.

There seems little chance that Mr. Dulles will recover in time to resume these endeavors, though his experience will still, we trust, be available to others. And since the prospect of a part-time Secretary serving a part-time President is so alarming, is it not in the best interest of the nation, our allies, the President, and Mr. Dulles himself that he be quickly replaced?

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Who Are the Jobless?

AS OF LAST MONTH, 76 of the 149 major areas on which the Department of Labor keeps unemployment records were ranked in the D, E and F classifications, as having six percent or more of their labor force unemployed. Eleven of these areas were in the F grouping, with 12 percent or more of their workers looking for work and unable to find it: Detroit and Muskegon, Michigan; Huntington, West Virginia; Buffalo, New York; five cities in Pennsylvania; and two in Puerto Rico.

In the week of January 11-17, 4,724,000 people were looking for work in a civilian labor force of 67,430,000 -- a rate of seven percent compared with a 6.7 percent rate one year ago. Who are these unemployed; how long have they been without work; what are their regular jobs when they have them?

As of now, 3,282,000 of the jobless are men; 1,441,000 of them are women. Compared with last year, 141,000 more men are looking for work and 99,000 more women.

Unemployment is always a problem among the school-leaving young: this year, 216,000 boys between 14 and 17 are looking for work as compared with 145,000 last year. The girls are doing better: where 72,000 of them were jobless last year, only 48,000 are without work today.

Among workers over 18, the biggest group last year were the 752,000 unemployed 18-24 year old men; this year, the biggest group are the men between 25 and 34—730,000 of them. Among men aged 18 to 45, the 1,977,000 looking for work are 99,000 fewer than last year. Among women of these ages it's the other way: 121,000 more of them are jobless.

Among older workers, the men over 45 looking for work—1,089,000 of them—number 169,000 more than a year ago. The number of unemployed women—8,000 fewer—is 369,000.

This year's figures differ from last year's also in the length of time the unemployed have been looking for jobs. Last year, 2,007,000 of the 4,494,000 unemployed had been job-hunting for only from one to four weeks; a further 1,622,000 had been out from five to 14 weeks; 556,000 from 15 to 26 weeks; 309,000 longer.

This January, many more people had been out for a long time: while 1,861,000 had lost their jobs within the last four weeks and 1,488,000 had been unemployed from five to 14 weeks, 557,000 were in the 15 to 26 week group, and the group without work for more than 26 weeks had jumped from 309,000 to 818,000.

Available figures on unemployment in various occupations gives some idea of which workers have shared in the business recovery, and which have been left aside. In steel, the unemployment rate, 11.2 percent in January, 1958, has dropped to 8.2 percent (but in January, 1957, it was only 2.6 percent); in autos, there has been an over-the-year improvement from 14.7 to 10.3 percent. For manufacturing as a whole, the year's increase has taken the rate only from 8.9 to 7.9 percent; in non-durable industries it is little changed at 7.5 percent, though in apparel an 11 percent rate a year ago has deteriorated to 12.5 percent.

Mining is worse off this January than last, with a 9.6 percent unemployment rate climbing to 11.7; construction, always badly off in cold weather, stands at 19.3 percent in comparison to 18.7 a year ago. Railway and railway express joblessness, at 9 percent last year, is now 8.4, but in other forms of transportation the rate has gone up from 5.7 to 8.4 percent.

Even in the service trades which, along with government employment, have fluctuated little recently, the rate is up from 3.5 percent last year to 4.7 now.

One cheerful note is the improvement in hours worked by employees who are on part-time for economic reasons: A pickup in the hard goods industries—fabricators of machinery and equipment for producers—where unemployment usually lingers longest after a business upturn, has reduced the number of part-timers from 1,953,000 a year ago to 1,255,000 today.

KEYSERLING ON INFLATION

Reprints are now available from **The New Republic** *—1244 19th Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.—of Leon Keyserling's article, "Is Inflation the Danger?"*

Single copy	— 10 cents
10 copies	— 75 cents
25 copies	— $1.50

New Soviet Workers

SOME OF THE most significant disclosures by Premier Khrushchev in his recent speech at the Soviet Party Congress came in generally-overlooked technical references to two urgent Soviet economic problems: the need for an expanded labor force and the imbalance of fuel resources. So that more women may enter the working class, Khrushchev promises more public catering centers, laundries and nurseries. "Many [women] are still occupied in their homes and looking after children," Khrushchev says. He also gives details "On Strengthening Ties Between School and Life," which is to say "School Children Must Work."

Current estimates suggest that only about 300,000 boys in the 16-year-old bracket will enter the Soviet labor market in 1960—compared with 2.4 million in 1955. The new educational plan envisages a basic eight-

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year primary education for all Soviet children. Secondary education, however, will be provided for the great majority of Soviet children "while working in production."

Khrushchev's emphasis on petroleum and gas production indicates a radical redesign of the Soviet fuel pattern. In the past about two-thirds of all Soviet coal was produced east of the Urals. Yet much of this coal output was consumed in European Russia. The high resultant transport cost has been a basic reason for the shift of emphasis in Soviet industrialization programs to non-European Russia. Henceforth, more than 40 percent of all capital outlay for industrialization will be concentrated in the "Eastern Region." At the same time that the East absorbs its own coal output, European Russia is to shift to gas and oil. Khrushchev envisages an increase of oil production in European Russia of 110 to 130 percent and an increase of 600 percent in gas production.

Stalemate in Algeria

Paris

FRENCH PREMIER Michel Debré's first official trip to Algeria has occurred at a time when the future of that unhappy land seems more uncertain than ever. To appease the fears of many European *colons*, he was forced to say categorically: "The truth is that Algeria is a land of French sovereignty." And though he has loyally sworn himself to respect his master, Charles de Gaulle's, studious avoidance of the word "integration," his latest remarks, like his earlier definitions of France's place in Algeria, amount to saying: "Integration by any other name smells just as sweet."

De Gaulle has been less categoric than Debré because he has not wanted to close any doors. It is nevertheless possible to detect two fundamental principles which have so far guided the General's thinking on the Algerian question. The first is his insistence that the political future of Algeria must be worked out through "democratic means," so that any negotiation with the FLN must be limited to effecting a cease-fire. The second is his deep-rooted conviction that whatever the eventual destiny of Algeria, it must be one which avoids both integration (which is impossible) and total severance from France (which would be a catastrophe for the French *and* the Algerians).

The FLN has openly challenged both these principles; thus the stalemate. On the one hand, its leaders have repeatedly refused to envisage any but "political" negotiations and they have challenged the validity of electoral tests in a wartorn territory. On the other hand, they have no less emphatically said that total independence is their goal. There is some truth in Messali Hadj's recent observation that "for having announced that it would negotiate only on the basis of independence, the FLN has stupidly made itself the prisoner of the word independence."

Given de Gaulle's refusal to accept the FLN's claim to be the sole representative of the true "will" of the Algerian people, it is hardly surprising that he should have shown himself to be in no hurry to make definite overtures to its leaders in Tunis. The recent flurry of reports about behind-the-scenes negotiations have now been officially denied by none other than the FLN leaders themselves, who recently told Jean Daniel, of the French weekly, *L'Express:* "We have never had an official or direct emissary."

Does this mean that we are witnessing the impact of an irresistible force meeting an immovable object? Everything to date suggests that de Gaulle is prepared for one of those protracted wars of protocol at which he proved himself such a master during World War II. The clearest evidence of this has been his reluctance to invite President Bourguiba of Tunisia and the Sultan of Morocco to Paris to discuss the future of the Mahgreb —a step which would logically precede negotiations with the leaders of the Algerian rebellion.

It may be that he has reasons of his own for the slow, methodical pace, yet with each passing month the complaints of his restive countrymen are certain to grow louder. It may be more difficult to invite Bourguiba and the king of Morocco to Paris tomorrow than it would have been four months ago. Indeed, the General's failure to seize the Algerian bull by the horns immediately after his massive referendum triumph may turn out to be one of those crucial missed opportunities.

Popular Education

A LARGELY IGNORED report from the US Office of Education shows that the student loan program authorized in last year's National Defense Education Act is 10 times more popular than Congress anticipated. Under the program, college students can borrow up to $1,000 a year for academic expenses. They do not have to begin repaying the loan until one year after they graduate, and then the terms are reasonable: 10 years to pay at 3 percent on the unpaid balance.

Congress last fall appropriated $6 million to get this program started. The colleges have to put one dollar of their own into their loan funds for every nine federal dollars received. By the end of 1959, more than 1,200 colleges and universities had asked for $62 million—466 of them never had a student loan program before.

The Administration has responded by proposing that Congress meet the students' demand about half-way: the President has requested that another $24 million be appropriated for fiscal 1959 and another $30 million for fiscal 1960.

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SENATOR MANSFIELD ON OUR GERMAN POLICY

"He is wrong," editorialized The New York Times *on the Senate speech of February 13 by Mike Mansfield. Yet, that speech is worth study for no other member of the Foreign Relations Committee has gone as far publicly in suggesting the possibility of negotiations between East and West Germans and the practicality of some form of military disengagement in Europe. Excerpts follow.*

THE KEY QUESTION has never been: Will Germany be unified? The question has long been: When and how will Germany be unified? We cannot ignore the fact that the East German regime exists. It is there at Pankow, and German Communists run it, even though Russians may pull the strings from behind the curtain. If neither side can be wished away, or subverted away, how is a unified Germany, this essential Germany, this inevitable Germany, going to emerge? It can only be built on the premise that the unity in Germany, if it is to come in peace, is likely to fall short of the ultimate goals set for it by both Communist nations and the free nations—the goal on the one hand, of a Communist totalitarian Germany and the goal, on the other, of a fully representative democracy in all Germany.

WE ARE IN BERLIN in order to get out, but to get out only on condition that the German political forces which stand for freedom in peace have a sure footing, an equal chance to survive, and to grow on their merits in the future capital of all Germany. After years of trying to get the Russians out of the innumerable places into which they sprawled after World War II, it is indeed strange to hear that we are insisting that the Russians must not, indeed, cannot leave Berlin. I question a policy which still presumes, as our policy does, that the great powers of World War II can bring about German reunification. The erstwhile Allies, the divided Allies of World War II, are not in the position to ordain a unification in peace for a revitalized Germany. It is the Germans, themselves, who will make the decisive decisions on unification. . . .

THERE ARE NOW military and para-military German forces in both East and West Germany. How are these forces to be integrated in peace? Is this a problem that can be solved by free, all-German elections, at least without extensive preparations by the Germans who officer these opposing forces? There are differing economic and social structures functioning in Western and Eastern Germany. How are these structures to be fused in peace? Can they be harmonized by free, all German elections, at least without extensive preparations by those Germans who operate them? If the unification of Germany is essential and inevitable and if it is neither our responsibility nor in the interest of this nation to seek that unity by force, then I submit that a policy which merely clings to an unrealizable slogan of free all-German elections, which does not pursue German unification by other means, is no policy at all. It is a strait-jacket.

THE NATURE AND EXTENT of German rearmament and of non-German armaments on German soil is one area of the problem of unification in which reasonable proposals for negotiation, wherever they may originate, ought not to be rejected out of hand. That is especially the case if these proposals related to the reduction of military power throughout Central Europe. I know full well that the Russians may have no intention of withdrawing from the Eastern European states in any circumstances. Nevertheless, I can see no reason to make it easier for them to justify their remaining by a seeming intransigence on our part. I cannot see that the road to eventual freedom of states like Poland and Czechoslovakia is made easier by such a process.

IT IS TIME to call upon German leaders of the two Berlin communities—East and West—to begin serious efforts to unify the municipal government and public services of that city. To that end, it would be helpful to enlist the conciliatory services of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. If agreement can be reached by East and West Germany to establish an all-Berlin government, then it will be desirable to replace both Soviet and Allied forces with a United Nations police force composed of contingents from nations not directly involved. That force might supervise the agreement and see to it that all routes of access to the city remain open until Berlin becomes once again the capital of a peaceful unified Germany. At the same time, the forces representing freedom in Berlin must be Germanized as rapidly as possible. It is time to think seriously of replacing the thousands of Allied military personnel in Berlin with German militia, fully supported by NATO guarantees.

I CANNOT SEE that there is going to be any peaceful solution of this problem without talk, a great deal of talk, between Germans who are in authority in the Federal Republic and Germans who purport to be in authority in the Eastern Zone. All-German elections may not be essential—but at least there must be a chance for men and women of Eastern Germany as well as Western Germany to express themselves and their political preferences and to participate in political affairs without the threat of terror. Whatever the details of the fusion of the two zones, they are best left to the Germans of the two zones. What the former Allies need to do is to see that a unified Germany is neither subjected to military pressures from its neighbors nor that it becomes a source of military pressure to its neighbors.

AGREEMENTS ARE NEEDED which will pull back the so-called ultimate weapons and the armed forces of both East and West from the points of imminent contact in Germany and Central Europe. Our policy, NATO's policies, do not exclude a careful consideration of the Rapacki plan, the Eden plan for a demilitarized zone in middle Europe or similar proposals in connection with the unification of Germany.

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"There Will Be No Editorial Page"

TIME

THE WEEKLY NEWSMAGAZINE

by BEN H. BAGDIKIAN

HENRY R. LUCE, co-founder, editor-in-chief and largest single stockholder of *Time* magazine, once told a school of journalism: "The owner-editor cannot honorably evade his personal confrontation with every aspect of truth in every aspect of his paper."

The problem of Truth in the news is an old one. In the process of struggling with it, *Time* magazine has, at least, solved the problem of success. It is the biggest, brightest and most powerful of the Big Three newsmagazines. It has a paid circulation of 2,250,000. It is the foundation for the publishing empire of Time, Inc.: *Time, Life, Fortune, Sports Illustrated, Time International, Life International, Life en Espanol, House & Home, Architectural Forum* and a complex of paper mills and radio-TV stations.

For millions of middle-class Americans it is the interpreter of national and world affairs. Thousands of foreigners get their major impression of the United States from it. The United States Information Agency last year distributed 1.8 million copies free in 56 foreign countries as part of the American propaganda effort.

The magazine has 500 carefully selected, well-paid staff members capable of the most skilled performance of almost any publication in the country. It has the most effective network of information gatherers in the United States, in terms of extensive coverage of particular subjects. On occasion its work is distinguished, showing by contrast the superficial coverage of other magazines and of many newspapers.

When it has a mind to, *Time* can develop the possibilities of a news event more imaginatively than almost any other news organization in the world; its writing and editing is bright, sometimes brilliant. But is it the Truth?

The elusiveness of Truth must have worried the editors of *Time* occasionally. But if so, they have spared the reader this human doubt. Each week the world is created absolute and dogmatic, the good guys on one side, the bad guys on the other, with *Time* holding the only scorecard. Only when the reader checks back does he discover that the good guy of October may be the bad guy of January, that Truth and *Time* change.

For example, was it the Truth, when *Time* reported Dwight Eisenhower's appearance at the start of his 1952 campaign in Abilene in the June 16, 1952, issue:

> They saw Ike, and they liked what they saw.
> They liked him because he turned out to be an amazingly good campaigner. . . . They liked him for his strong, vigorous manner of speech, for his quiet control. . . . It was a crashing conquest.

Or was it the Truth when, after the campaign was over, *Time* in its issue of November 3, 1952, described that same week in Abilene:

> At first the echoes were not strong. Ike . . . as a political candidate . . . did not quite "come across" . . . his voice was flat; he looked like an old man on TV. . . .

Time, during the 1952 campaign:

> . . . Stevenson tore into this straw man . . . the Democratic candidate made a careful pitch. . . . In the same speech, Stevenson got in a reference to aid to India, which is getting to be the stock Democratic way of changing the subject on China.

Time, four years later: "Stevenson of 1952, a man meticulously concerned with the facts. . . . "

Time, before Adlai Stevenson became a Presidential candidate:

> . . . Illinois has a good governor now: Adlai Ewing Stevenson. . . . In his three years . . . Stevenson has . . . sent state police out to stop commercial gambling downstate . . . lopped 1,300 political hangers-on off the

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BEN H. BAGDIKIAN *is a reporter on* The Providence Journal-Bulletin *in which his study of the newsmagazines originally appeared. Previous articles on* U. S. News and World Report *and* Newsweek *appeared in* The New Republic *of February 2 and February 16, respectively. This is the concluding analysis in this series.*

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> state payroll . . . he didn't think State's Attorney John Boyle of Chicago was a good candidate. Stevenson has largely kept hands off law enforcement in Cook County, on the theory that local authorities are better staffed to handle it. But he didn't like the way Boyle had done the job . . . promptly dumped Boyle. . . . If Lincoln Steffens was right, corruption is the norm of US political life. . . . But men like Adlai Stevenson have dedicated themselves to a more hopeful and dynamic proposition: that the US is not a static pattern but an experiment, among other things—in good government.

Time, after Stevenson became a Presidential candidate, eight days before election:

> Stevenson . . . has himself cited his record as governor to support his argument that he can deal with corruption; he tells his audience that he knows about corruption because he followed "eight years of Republican rascality." He never so much as slapped the wrist of the Cook County Democratic organization, the most corrupt and powerful of existing big-city machines. . . .

Time, August 1, 1955, on President Eisenhower's accomplishment at Geneva:

> . . . If Geneva was to be measured by the spirit, as all the participants insisted it should be, then quite a bit was achieved . . . the chances of war started by the Russians is continuing to diminish. This was the reading of Geneva.

Time, May 19, 1958, quoting Dean Acheson approvingly to support *Time's* thesis that a Summit conference should not be held:

> From former (1949-53) US Secretary of State Dean Acheson came two forceful, well-argued statements on US foreign policy. . . . The 1955 Geneva Conference, said Dean Acheson, "was not merely a failure; it was a fraud and positive harm. . . . "

The changeability of Truth in the pages of *Time* was noted in 1955 by a Harvard student, Milton S. Gwirtzman, who listed in the *Harvard Crimson* some *Time* Truths which seemed to change with Administrations.

Time, March 10, 1952, on the income tax under a Democratic Administration:

> This week, once again, the American taxpayer . . . was working over his income tax return. He did not do the job happily. . . . The blow, in full and crushing measure, now lands each March 15 on the chin of a fellow named John Q.

Time, April 18, 1955, on the income tax during a Republican Administration:

> . . . 60 million Americans have by this week signed their 1954 income tax forms. . . . They did this, wonderful to tell, without riots or protest. . . . It has become more and more unfashionable to criticize the income tax level.

Time, August 12, 1946, on the character of George E. Allen under a Democratic Administration:

> Last week . . . the President [Truman] eased his craniest crony, George E. Allen, into the Board of Directors of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.

And on January 28, 1946: "George is all the more remarkable because to the naked eye, he is a clown."

Time, December 14, 1954, on the character of George E. Allen under a Republican Administration: "Last week . . . the President [Eisenhower] chatted quietly with . . . golfing companion George E. Allen, Washington lawyer and friend of Presidents."

Time throughout the 1956 campaign ridiculed public questions about the risk of having a sick President in office; or as it said in the July 22, 1956, issue on the President's decision to run again: " . . . Settled the issue with the simplicity and finality of a one-foot putt." And 16 months after the campaign, *Time* raised the question, in its March 3, 1958, issue:

> President Eisenhower is 67; the cumulative effect of his three major illnesses has sapped his second-term strengths. . . . Most of the work curtailment has come in the field of domestic affairs . . . if allowed to slide, small problems can snowball into major cases, *e.g.*, the present economic recession, and it is in this area that the President's inability to ride constant herd is most often felt.

The late William Allen White once wrote:

> I think on the whole, sooner or later, the American people do get the truth. But they often get it when it is cold potatoes and does them no good.

TIME once claimed that the top men in their fields of work in America vote *Time* their favorite magazine: "They depend on its accuracy." Yet, "accuracy" is not always easy to judge in journalism. It may be a matter of judgment, knowledge and the integrity of the reporter. The dominant rule is objectivity, or the reporting of facts with a minimum of the reporter's own opinions about them. This, too, has difficulties. As *Time* once said in its Press section in a piece entitled, "The Fetish of Objectivity":

> One of the most treacherous journalistic clichés is that a news story should always "let the facts speak for themselves." Thoughtful newspapermen know that the facts alone seldom can, that they speak clearly only when they are told in proper order and perspective—and thus interpreted by an honest journalist.

The question is: does the reporter collect all the facts he can and then draw a picture based on the facts? Or does he have a preconceived idea and collect only the facts that bear it out?

In American politics and foreign news, *Time's* reporting appears to be governed by an iron rule: when the

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facts fit the mold of *Time's* wishes, the reporting can be superb; when they do not fit the mold, *Time's* reporting can be so distorted as to raise serious questions about responsibility in mass communications.

It was interesting, then, on March 17, 1958, to see the conclusions-first-or-facts-first problem appear in the back of the magazine, in the Press Section. Here, in a piece entitled "Silver-Lining the Slump?", *Time* concluded that in general American newspapers were suppressing news of the recession, or as it said: "Newspapers from Seattle to Savannah were doing their unlevel best to bull their way through one of the nation's biggest—and most botched—running stories: the recession."

To support its conclusion that daily newspapers were suppressing news of the recession, *Time* offered the reader 14 specific items of evidence.

No. 1 was its lead sentence: DECLINE HERE? DON'T BELIEVE IT! headlined the *Fort Worth Star-Telegram* on Page One last week." This was a correct quotation of the headline and it was a story on the rosy side, listing aircraft and defense contracts in effect locally. *Time* did not report that the same newspaper was regularly running even bigger headlines on Page One, like the eight-column, 72-point banner:

TEXAS OIL ALLOWABLE SLASHED TO ALL-TIME LOW, and the five-column, 72-point: 5,200,000 JOBLESS. While *Time* praised a few papers for running financial columnist Sylvia Porter, who, it said, reported the slump realistically, it did not say the *Fort Worth Star-Telegram* carries Sylvia Porter.

Item No. 2. "Though more than 50,000 workers are out of jobs in Georgia's four largest cities, the *Atlanta Journal* has zealously kept the state's slump off the front page, and until last week, even banned the word recession from the paper." This appears to be inaccurate: The *Atlanta Journal* earlier sent its own reporters through the state and then ran on Page One their stories telling of a serious depression in agriculture, Georgia's major activity. The term "current business recession" is found on Page One months before the *Time* story.

Item No. 3. "In Los Angeles, where layoffs have idled nearly six percent of the work force, Hearst's *Herald & Express* whooped: ROSY L.A. ECONOMY SEEN." If the *Herald & Express* "whooped" with the story, it "whooped" on Page Eight. Other recession and unemployment stories had appeared on more prominent pages.

Item No. 4. "Scripps-Howard's *Memphis Press-Scimitar* last week ran a glowing story on expansion plans for a local Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. plant—without mentioning that 2,600 of its 3,600 employees have been laid off." This appears to be entirely inaccurate. The paper ran no story, "glowing" or otherwise, about Firestone expansion that week. A statement by a company official on past expansion ran six months earlier. The Firestone Company says that at no time did it have 2,600 employees laid off. An official said: "In no month during that period were as many as 10 percent of that figure laid off."

Item No. 5. "In Atlanta, the *Journal* suppressed the news of a layoff of 2,000 Lockheed Aircraft workers last fall until it could report that the factory had found other jobs for them." The Lockheed Company announced the layoffs August 15. The *Atlanta Constitution,* morning-side of the *Constitution-Journal* combination, ran the story on Page One the morning of August 15. The *Journal* ran it with a three-column headline on an inside page that afternoon. Its story on the factory finding jobs for other workers ran four months later when the company announced it.

A CHECK of the 14 items of evidence of suppression shows almost the same pattern throughout. In one case it reported the opposite of what an editor, noted for his integrity, says he told the *Times* reporter. In a display of headlines clipped from newspapers, which *Time* presented as "HOPEFUL HEADLINES," "We don't want to scare advertisers," it used headlines that accurately summarized speeches and public statements; in one case the headline quoted was sarcastic, stressing by irony that times are bad; in others it showed small, inside-page headlines while ignoring Page One 96-point headlines in the same paper saying "SLUMP WORSENS. . . . "

In another case it took part of a headline display and did not reproduce the main portion, which gave the totally opposite impression. In another it reproduced a Page Two headline over a report of a national speech; to cut this out it must have been necessary to pass the scissors a quarter of an inch from another 36-point headline on a report of a speech reading: "GOP IS GETTING SLUMP IT PLANNED."

Thus, of the 14 "facts" *Time* presented to the reader to support its conclusion, one was correct, two were apparently wrong (based on what men later say they said, granting they could conceivably have said something else in private earlier); six were so unrepresentative as to give an essentially false impression; and five were demonstrably false. It is possible daily papers did play down the recession, but it has not been proved by *Time* in any evidence it gave the reader.

One month after *Time's* story, its competitor, *Newsweek,* reported:

> HOW U.S. NEWSPAPERS ARE COVERING THE RECESSION. . . . Wire service logs showed that, in quantity of copy and the play it was getting, the recession was easily the biggest story of the spring season. . . . Syndicated writers shuttled in and out of hard-hit industrial centers. . . . Most newsmen agreed it was their duty to report the story as they found it, whether the news was good or bad.

The key to *Time* reportage is not the hard news reported to it by the *New York Times*, the *New York Herald Tribune,* the Associated Press, United Press In-

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ternational and its own staff in the field. The key is how it is written in the high reaches of the offices in Rockefeller Center, New York.

Noel Busch, cousin of the late Briton Hadden, the man who co-founded *Time* magazine in 1923 with Henry R. Luce, says of his experience on the magazine that *Time* regards as ideal that: "Writers should not witness the events they write about." It is the writer away from the scene, passing the story back and forth among the editors, who gives to the *Time* story the impact it will have on the reader.

If one isolates the facts from the tone words added by *Time's* editors, the pattern appears. It is typical of *Time's* political reporting that the political world is generally divided into the forces of evil and the forces of virtue. If a political figure is a devil—in *Time's* perdition—he helps an elderly lady across the street just to impress the neighbors. If he is a political angel—floating in *Time's* heaven—his hand at the aged elbow is a sign of innate kindness.

IN 1951, the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, was a *Time* devil, an outstanding culprit of the Truman-Acheson Gang. While *Time* was not alone in characterizing Acheson as a menace, it was perhaps the most sophisticated and effective organ in destroying public confidence in Acheson. It did this not so much with rational argument and fact, as with the tone of words added in Rockefeller Center. Such words from its cover story on Acheson on January 8, 1951, include:

> . . . This week . . . he expanded his gloomy note. . . . What people thought of Dean Gooderham Acheson ranged from the proposition that he was a fellow-traveler, or a wool-brained sower of "seeds of jackassery" or an abysmally uncomprehending man, or an appeaser or a warmonger who was taking the US into a world war, to the warm if not so audible defense that he was a great secretary of state, a brilliant executor of the best of all foreign programs. . . . In his fifth floor office in Foggy Bottom he tried not to listen to the criticism . . . with his blue, slightly protuberant eyes studied his foreign policy. It was not a very encouraging study . . . to what extent was Acheson to blame. . . . Acheson therefore inherited some of the policies and problems which he had helped create . . . was well on the way to becoming an immeasurable disaster . . . one of the major decisions and disastrous phases that have boomeranged to plague him. . . . The one reason . . . was to provide Acheson's State Department with an alibi for its share in China's tragic disaster . . . State Department, by its acts and by its failure to act . . . had bribed . . . thrown China's door open to Russia. . . . Acheson's State Department continued hopefully to stroke the fur of the Red leader . . . most notable survivor among the architects of the "China mistake" is Secretary Acheson. . . . The case against Dean Acheson . . . policy has disastrously failed in Asia. The misreading of the Red Chinese . . . he must take full responsibility . . . the old animus against Chiang Kai-shek. . . . On the record, US policy in Europe is in a crucial state of hesitation. . . . Acheson and the Administration . . . could not get around the fact of Western Europe's anguished resignation. . . . Acheson has been invariably punctilious and polite . . . in the end . . . he had too frequently let himself be pulled down to the level of his hem-hawing, tiptoeing fellow-conferees. . . . The question was whether a different secretary of state might have done more. . . . He possesses some of the intellectual arrogance . . . a highly civilized man, an intellectual snob. . . . No blood, no sweat, no tears ever smudge the neat laundering of Acheson's sentences, or the mannerisms of his theories . . . the US people . . . cannot quite tune in on him. . . . Has Dean Acheson become . . . a national danger? . . .

In its January 3, 1955, issue, *Time* did a cover story on Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Like Acheson, Dulles had become a matter of bitter dispute in the United States. The tone, words and phrases from that story:

> . . . John Foster Dulles looked squarely at the man . . . pressed Molotov with greater skill and force than any US diplomat had ever shown . . . one sharp stroke after another . . . Dulles rescued other millions from gullibility . . . trips to re-inforce the free world outposts . . . develop cohesion and strength . . . Dulles played the key role . . . Dulles' patient year of work and travel . . . Dulles both drew upon and nourished US confidence . . . this emphasis on US interests had a wholesome effect of stimulating the national prides of other Western nations . . . he played the year's most effective role . . . he was nimble in disentangling himself from his errors . . . after long and careful negotiation . . . Dulles . . . played goalkeeper in the free world's two major setbacks. . . . A smaller man than Dulles might have insisted . . . had a brilliant career . . . applied Christian principles to historic realities . . . soundest bit of diplomacy . . . Dulles' restraint was deliberate . . . his highly practical analysis . . . Dulles analyzed . . . was all the more forceful because Dulles' line had already been proved right . . . At that kind of diplomatic opinion-molding, John Foster Dulles is a master. . . . He recognizes the importance . . . works hard . . . tries again, tirelessly . . . gained new confidence . . . remarkable for their sweep and clarity . . . goes tirelessly about that business . . . displays a tremendous capacity for concentration and work . . . depth of the concentration. . . . Dulles is providing direction . . . cleared the ground . . . stop epidemics of fear . . . Dulles disregarded the cries of those . . .

It would be unrealistic in the extreme to expect any news to make a mathematically or emotionally precise division pro-and-con. And in commentary one is dealing with opinion and judgment. But it is interesting that of about 640 lines on Acheson in the *Time* story, about 74 percent is directly negative and critical; in the 670 lines on Dulles, only 4 percent. *Time* did not repeat directly

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the common anti-Acheson phrase of the time recalling that Acheson had said he would not turn his back on Alger Hiss. But it did use the phrase obliquely twice in the story: "Although he might have preferred to turn his back on the East" . . . and "Asia on which he had turned his back."

A major method of loading the story is to mention the positive arguments for a devil and follow with material wiping it out. Thus, of the 640 lines on Acheson, 23 are devoted to the major achievements which *Time* attributed to Acheson's regime, which on reflection, appear considerable: Lend-Lease, UNRRA, World Bank, Export-Import Bank, Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, NATO. But though it took 17 words to describe that "Acheson presided over the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty creating (on paper) a collective defense system," it then took 22 words immediately afterward to say, "The idea had not been his; it had originated in a resolution presented by Senator Arthur Vandenberg, approved by a Republican Senate . . . " Again, when it mentioned his "new anti-Russian policy," it followed by saying that it fell short of the need.

In the case of Dulles, some 96 percent is devoted to approving and positive declarations. Curiously, it made some damning statements—but these consisted of 14 lines followed by 210 lines of more praise, then 12 lines of criticism, and a final conclusion of high approval. The two small negative insertions might strike a reader as somewhat underemphasized: "Despite these attempts . . . the free world came to a year's end with a net loss and a troubled outlook in Asia." And "After two years in office, the Eisenhower Administration has failed to plug the yawning gap in its foreign policy. . . . "

Time did not exclude unpleasant facts completely. In the case of a man it condemned, Acheson, it buried 62 lines of his considerable achievements in an avalanche—477 lines—of emotionally loaded words that stained the image. In the case of a man it approved of, Dulles, it buried 26 lines of grave and fundamental criticism, in an avalanche, 617 lines, of words that glowed with heroic praise.

Underneath it all, the reader could extract the basic facts if he worked at it. But the basic facts could conceivably come in a form which does the *Time* reader—a citizen who votes—no good. If, on the other hand, one grants that *Time* has a right to its opinions, one may judge how the opinions hold up.

In the Dulles profile, *Time's* opinion was:

> Regionally, 1954's greatest area of success for American diplomacy and the man who runs it was the Middle East. There, a number of old problems were solved by new approaches . . . the status of the Suez Canal area was settled more firmly than ever before . . . the settlement was skillfully midwifed by the US State Department.

According to some observers, Suez resulted in one of the gravest disasters for the West and for American diplomacy in this decade, and Hungary brought a disillusionment with America's "liberation" policy. Yet during this period, *Time*, on December 13, 1956, told the reader that things were never better for the United States position abroad: "The world's gaze and the world's hopes were directed toward Washington as rarely before. . . . In time of crisis and threat of World War III, President Eisenhower had cast US policy in a role to reflect the US's basic character. . . . "

Walter Lippmann that same week said " . . . the initiative and the power are not in our hands, and we found ourselves doing what we did not want to do. . . . "

James Reston, chief of the *New York Times* Washington bureau, said that the general feeling in Washington was that "the Soviet Union and Egypt have scored a tremendous victory."

Obviously, *Time* disagreed with both. The magazine said Reston "reported nonsensically." Later, Editor-in-Chief Henry R. Luce of *Time* wrote to Reston apologizing. Mr. Luce wrote that Reston was not nonsensical, he was only wrong.

A SYMBOLIC word for the discriminating reader of *Time* magazine is "cry." In the normal vocabulary it is a verb meaning to make a loud call, to utter lamentations, or to weep. But in the lexicon of *Time*style it means: A Fool Is Shouting Hysterical Nonsense. For in *Time* villains "cry"; the heroes "solemnly state."

There are other words the student of *Time* learns. The modern Republican President of the United States when irritated "snaps" back an answer. "Snap" means that the question has been in bad taste or stupid and the President is showing manly spirit. But a New Deal-Fair Deal Democratic President "snarls" or "sputters" or "spouts."

Stylistically, the result is the most dramatic, crisp and evocative language in the news profession. But politically it is a vapor of bias that seeps into the text, clouding facts and bypassing the normal critical judgment of the reader. It is a highly artistic technique, but a study of *Time's* behavior in recent political campaigns shows that it is used as a partisan political weapon.

A study of the magazine during the 1952 and 1956 Presidential campaigns leaves the impression that *Time* was the most effective propaganda printed for the benefit of the Republican National Committee. The bias appeared in the balance of space, in the selection of facts, and in the use of pictures and illustrations. But the chief weapon was the emotional prejudgment with which it surrounded the news. A reader cannot argue long over a strictly personal selection of adjectives by a writer. But if these selections fall into a clear political pattern, the reader has a right to know it.

In the September 1, 1952, issue under "REPUBLICANS, The Rediscovery," a story about General Dwight Eisen-

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hower—leaving out the news core—began:

> A great American soldier disclosed political greatness —rediscovered courage as a policy for a nation. Out of his own wide experience with the fateful issues of the 20th Century, Dwight D. Eisenhower phrased a definition of the peril besetting the US . . . a definition so compelling . . . it displayed . . . his credentials as a candidate for President . . . a good speech, in both the moral and political sense . . . Ike calculated with grim arithmetic . . . turned to the kind of shrewd analysis . . . which the US seldom hears from its officials. . . .

In the same issue, under "DEMOCRATS, Away From It All," a story about Adlai Stevenson—leaving out the news core—began:

> Candidate Adlai Stevenson climbed into his state-owned, two-engined Beechcraft last week and flew off to the Wisconsin woods . . . hours loafing . . . a little half-hearted casting. . . . Evenings he lolled in the bearskin-draped living room before a fieldstone fireplace big enough to take 7-foot logs, which were hauled automatically from the basement at the touch of a button . . . he did little work. . . .

On October 10, 1956, *Time* reported the appearance of both Stevenson and Eisenhower at a farmers' gathering:

> Here, on rolling land near Newton, Iowa, some 8,000 American farmers and townsmen, their wives, kids and relatives assembled . . . giving their attention to their honorary chairman—President Dwight Eisenhower—honed to intellectual sharpness . . . dwelt on a theme . . . his own inner peace. . . .
>
> From the same giant platform . . . Adlai Stevenson made a major bid for the farm vote at Newton. . . . Stevenson promised the farmers everything but the moon on behalf of the Democrats. . . . From the past, Stevenson dragged out a familiar Democratic tactic . . . contended Adlai, in an astonishing defense of . . .

The title of the Eisenhower story was: "Ike's Promise." The title of the Stevenson story was: "Adlai's Pitch."

This relatively subtle technique does not mean that *Time* neglected the blunt instrument of loaded pictures. In the 13 issues covering the 1952 campaign, *Time* printed 21 photographs of Eisenhower, all of them showing him in a favorable light—heroic, or friendly, or earnest. Stevenson's face in these issues appeared only 13 times, the two largest facial shots from photographs taken 30 years before, and 40 percent of the total showed Stevenson in unflattering poses eating, drinking or grimacing.

Eisenhower's picture appeared on Page One of National Affairs in *Time* three times, on Page Two four times during the campaign period. Stevenson's never appeared on Page One of National Affairs.

In 1956, *Time* dealt heavily in cartoons. In the 13 pre-election issues it showed 10 cartoons involving the personal figure of Stevenson, all of them derogatory. It showed none that portrayed Eisenhower personally in a derogatory way. While Eisenhower regularly "dwelt" on subjects or stated them, Stevenson "cried" or, as *Time* said October 8, 1956: " . . . Adlai Stevenson went whirling across the US landscape last week, spouting sparks and smoke. . . . "

TIME'S severest distortions are in the area of national politics and China policy. Both appear to be matters of deep conviction on the part of Editor-in-Chief Henry R. Luce. He is involved more deeply in the present Administration than any other American publisher. And as the son of missionaries in China, where Luce grew up, it is said that the Editor-in-Chief retains the dream of Christianizing China and insists on unflagging support of Christian Chiang Kai-shek.

The bias does not usually keep important facts out of the magazine. But sympathetic facts are presented with dignity and joy; unsympathetic ones with ridicule and contempt. Describing visiting dignitaries at the 1952 Republican convention, *Time* said:

> And there was former President Herbert Hoover . . . the old gentleman smiled a cautious smile. . . . Time had whitened his hair . . . and softened the lines of his face. For 20 years he had suffered with dignity and without complaint an *auto da fe* of criticism such as few men . . . have ever endured. . . . But this was his night among friends. . . .

Describing the visiting dignitaries at the 1952 Democratic convention:

> Hefty, hearty India Edwards . . . a woman with an eye on the vice presidency . . . tramped to the speaker's stand splendidly corseted . . . fogged in some fast opening lines. . . . Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose new frizzy hairdo made her look like a genial golliwog. . . .

The difference in the descriptions of these two persons in *Time* is unimportant. What is important is that the corset-golliwog content of Democratic stories was always high during the campaigns and practically absent in Republican stories; and the "suffered with dignity" content was high in Republican stories, absent in Democratic.

Nor need one be pro-Democratic or anti-Republican to question the ethics of such political reporting in a publication that tells the reader he is getting news in *Time, The Weekly Newsmagazine*. *Time* pursues its political enemies and boosts its friends by another technique. If facts are damaging to friends, it mentions the facts briefly and then rebuts them at length or dismisses them with editorial contempt. If they are damaging to enemies, *Time* dwells on them at length, may even base its entire reportage on them and accepts them as proved conclusions. When, for example, the 1952 Republican

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convention compromised the civil rights issue, *Time* reported:

> . . . one of the convention's youngest and prettiest delegates was the central figure in a struggle over civil rights. Mrs. Mildred Younger, a 31-year-old Los Angeles housewife, presided over the civil rights subcommittee with an intelligent, calm hand. . . . The subcommittee was bitterly divided. . . . As a result . . . came out with a plank that each side could construe as it wished.

A short time later the Democrats did the same thing: "To satisfy two men with such divergent views on civil rights as Russell and Harriman was a real triumph in fence-straddling for Stevenson."

Pretty Mrs. Younger presided with an intelligent hand; Stevenson fence-straddled.

Often during the campaign, *Time* did not trust the Republicans to make their own arguments, but provided the reader with its own. When television viewers saw that the Republican delegates at the convention paid no attention whatever to the platform, *Time* volunteered: "The delegates' inattention was not necessarily evidence that they did not care what was in the platform. They knew that the resolutions committee. . . . "

Another technique is to concentrate on the mechanics or the messy details of an enemy operation, but to dwell on the spiritual side of a friend. When Sen. John Sparkman was nominated Democratic Vice Presidential candidate in 1952:

> John Jackson Sparkman, who had just been nominated for Vice President of the United States, stopped grinning, fished a cough drop out of his mouth and slipped it through a crack in the platform floor. "There," commented an unsympathetic observer bitterly, "is a man who has every quality a Democratic candidate for Veep needs: he's from the South." This comment contained considerable truth. . . . Sparkman, in fact, is so resolute a compromiser that it takes a political micrometer to tell just where he stands. . . .

But apparently *Time* had no unsympathetic observers at the Republican convention: "The meeting quickly settled on California's Richard Nixon. No deal was involved. Nixon was a logical choice. . . . " Its description of Sparkman during the the campaign was minimal but repeated many criticisms made by others. Its treatment of Nixon did not, although Nixon had been bitterly criticized by many Americans:

> . . . the most up-to-date attraction at the Illinois State Fair last week was a goodlooking, dark-haired young man with a manner both aggressive and modest, and a personality to delight any political barker. He seemed to have everything—a fine TV manner, an attractive family, a good war record, deep sincerity and religious faith . . . He was Richard Milhous (pronounced mill house) Nixon, Republican nominee for Vice President. . . .

Time tended to take Republican statements at face value, and where the Republicans failed to say things, *Time* volunteered them; if the Republicans said embarrassing things, *Time* explained them away. Yet what Democrats said usually was looked at critically, or cynically, and then rebutted. During the 1956 campaign, for example:

> One day last week Stevenson . . . was disturbed, he said, that the Republicans might be trying to fob off Eisenhower upon a "docile, complacent, carefree people all happily chanting, 'Peace, Prosperity and Progress—ain't it wonderful' . . . Candidate Stevenson obviously felt he had a point. . . ."

Time then went on to explain on its own—in a report of Democratic campaign activities—

> The US has learned to live with its crises with equanimity . . . if there seems to be little interest in it as an election-year issue, it is only because the search is constant and the US is always new.

TIME regularly in the campaign drifted from Republican statements into heroic prose affirming those statements. And it regularly devoted part of the space under its heading "DEMOCRATS" to Republican [or its own] attacks on Democrats.

In a cover story on Vice Presidential candidate Kefauver it started with a reference to Kefauver pitching manure and thereafter put the word "shovel," and "pitch" in the text describing his speeches. Aside from this, directly derogatory material constituted 30 percent of the story, with *Time* adding editorial agreement. The story on Nixon was an almost unbroken epic of approval, brushing past criticisms to even higher praise:

> . . . while he is a politician to his fingertips, Nixon is a man of consistent principle, whose values are as sound and fundamental as any in US politics today. . . . Had Nixon been the weak, unprincipled character that his more choleric enemies make him out to be, he might well have given up. . . .

In an October, 1952, profile of Stevenson, 55 percent was unflattering, derogatory or otherwise damaging, much of that 55 percent being used to counter or nullify positive material. The Eisenhower cover story had only three percent derogatory lines and with these *Time* took the initiative to answer: "One of the Democratic charges against Eisenhower is that he is vague on issues. Actually, while Ike's prose is vague in style, his speeches are highly specific in content. . . . "

An analysis of its behavior during the 1952 and 1956 political campaigns casts serious doubts on its own early prospectus:

"There will be no editorial page in *Time*.

"No article will be written to prove any special case."

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Negotiating a Berlin Settlement

A "European" Approach to Germany's Future

by EUGENE V. ROSTOW

THE Soviet plan for Berlin is ingeniously calculated to give us a choice à la Munich, between appeasement and war. Do we abandon Berlin to the Communists, or do we (or the West German forces) prepare to fire the first shot, seeking to move convoys past possible East German road blocks, three or six months after the turnover? Or are there alternative choices that might be sought with some hope of success?

Three hypotheses might explain the nature and timing of the latest Soviet initiative.

First, the Russians may be seeking limited objectives in Germany by their present push; it may turn out to be merely another of the postwar crises through which they have tested our will, our nerve, and our resolution, seeking limited gains, but invariably backing down, as in Turkey, Iran, Greece, Berlin, Yugoslavia and Korea, when it becomes clear that we are determined to insist on our rights, and to protect our national interests.

Second, the Russian announcement about Berlin may signal a radically new policy, which would risk war by seeking to take over the whole of Western Europe, within the next few years.

Third, Mr. Mikoyan's bold and risky journey to the United States may be the first step in a Great Courtship. Behind an appropriate façade of belligerent loyalty to China, he may have opened a negotiation aimed at stabilizing Russo-Western relations, keeping nuclear weapons out of Chinese hands, and looking to the development of a Russo-Western association to curb and control the ambitions of the Chinese regime—as dangerous to the Russians as they are to us.

Neither the pattern of events nor the balance of power —insofar as they can be known to persons outside the government—yet points clearly to any one of these three hypotheses as the most likely basis for the Soviet's program. But this much can be said. The Communists took many risks during the period of our atomic monopoly, notably in China, but in that period they always stopped short of chancing general war. Latterly, their diplomatic moves seem to show a connection between political positions and the state of the weapons race. They broke off disarmament negotiations in London immediately after announcing a great advance in missiles. The Summit Agreement of 1955—calling for the unification of Germany through free elections—was breached after the Geneva conference on atomic energy revealed the comparative state of science in the two camps. Many events, including the superiority of Russian missiles and other weapons, may explain at least the timing of the present Russian move.

Moreover, in a longer perspective, it is by no means clear that the Soviets view the prospect of war with as much loathing as we do. The two great wars of this century, and the prolonged Cold War, have permitted the Communist movement to make gains which would never have occurred otherwise. In the modern world, war may lead to disorganization on such a scale as to give determined groups favorable opportunities for seizing power by force.

Whatever reasons may account for the Berlin ultimatum coming at this moment, what are its objects? Almost certainly they include a desire to end the influence of Berlin as a source of infection in the Eastern satellites and in the Soviet Union, both as an excessively attractive example of Western life patterns, and an unpalatably easy escape route for the disaffected.

There are more sinister possibilities. The root of rebellion in Hungary and Poland, and in the Soviet Union, too, as the Pasternak affair showed, is the enormous appeal of Western civilization to the peoples of the Soviet Empire. Are we approaching the point at which the Soviet quest for safety will lead the Soviet rulers to reconsider their postwar policy of acquiescence in West European democracy? Is the Sovietization of Western Europe a Russian answer to the risk of an erosive cancer —the yearning for human freedom—which the Communists cannot otherwise control? Khrushchev's reactionary educational program is one basic attack on the strength and freedom of the intellectual élite in the Soviet Union. Can that policy hope to succeed so long as the influences of civilization seep into the Soviet Union through the

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contact of Soviet intellectuals with the literature and peoples of the West, and of their own rich enlightenment?

And does the development of China make the Russians more willing now than in 1948 or 1949 to contemplate the gradual conquest of Western Europe, even at some risk of war? One simple way to restore the threatened primacy of the Soviet Union in the Communist world would be to add the population and economic power of Western Europe to the Soviet account. The techniques of intimidation developed to paralyze the poor Finns may soon have wider spheres of application.

If these are elements of Soviet thought in contemplating the problems of world politics, this is close to the moment for the Russians to act. Many observers believe that their missile superiority is now so great that they are indeed in a position to threaten massive nuclear attack on the United States, as Marshal Malinovsky has said, without serious risk of any retaliation whatever.

If this is the truth about our military position, or if the Russians believe it to be true, then the Berlin crisis is an extremely dangerous approach to the brink of war. It would not be remarkable to discover that the Chinese influence alliance favors war between Russia and the West.

As Mr. Mikoyan's extraordinary whistle-stop campaign here testifies, however, there are probably men within the Soviet leadership who wish to avoid a war, if it can be avoided.

The Soviet peace party may have several alternative interests in peace. Some of its members undoubtedly believe war is unnecessary to achieve the aims of Communism, in view of the weakness and disarray of the Western coalition in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia. After all, Communism has made great progress, both at home and abroad, during the last few years. Others may fear the unpredictable consequences of war to the status of Communist power within the countries now controlled by the Communist parties and their armed forces. Some, surely, oppose war as an evil in itself. There may, however, be another element in their view. Mr. Mikoyan may have taken his adventurous journey to initiate a well disguised rapprochement with the West at the expense of China.

Certainly these possibilities deserve to be explored cautiously, secretly, and without yielding at any point to blackmail or threats of force. Perhaps we should underscore the point by not negotiating until June, as the French and Germans suggest. But there is no reason not to negotiate at all. The *status quo*, in Germany or elsewhere is not the wisest arrangement that could be conceived to protect our national interests. There is more than enough room for negotiations of mutual advantage, if the Soviets are really interested in reducing tension.

The hazards of negotiation are all too apparent. Our government will have to recast, articulate and explain a united Western policy in all its essential rightness; prepare American and world opinion for its defense; conduct effective, imaginative, secret and well-conceived negotiations with the Soviets, on an allied basis, while military resources are being unostentatiously deployed; and perhaps have recourse at a given point to the procedures of the United Nations. The difficulties of such diplomacy, spread out over months, do not have to be stressed. As time ticks on, plausible alternatives will be proposed in every batch of telegrams, and every letters' column of the *Times*. The British face an election. The fear of war will be exploited. Every public and private resource of diplomacy will be employed to weaken our resolve, and persuade us to buy a deal that would assure us "peace in our time."

There are several theatres of negotiation where progress could readily be made if the Russians care to make progress: the exploration of modes of protection against surprise attack; the question of atomic test limitation; and even the delicate problem of creating nuclear free zones in Europe and in Asia, as suggested by Khrushchev in his speech before the 21st Communist Party Congress in Moscow two weeks ago. Of all the unsettled questions between us and the Soviet Union, that of Germany is the most obvious, although by no means the easiest.

WHAT are the essential interests at stake in the German problem? We wish to free East Germany from Soviet control. The Potsdam agreement binds us and the Russians to do so. The inhabitants of East Germany wish to be free. We have a deep and inescapable security interest in seeing the border of Soviet power moved back to a less threatening line.

If the Russians are willing to contemplate this possibility, the conventional *quid pro quo* always mentioned, although never firmly committed, is the neutrality of Germany as a whole. While a demilitarized East Germany would be a step forward for us, as compared with a Communist East Germany, we must not and cannot consider agreeing to the neutralization of Germany as a whole, for the reasons which emerged so clearly a year ago, during the debate over "disengagement" in Eastern Europe. After all, NATO was created, and our troops are in Europe, only because the Soviet Union failed to carry out the agreements of Yalta and Potsdam, guaranteeing the political freedom of Eastern and Central Europe. Why this fact is not the clear-cut major premise of our public position has never been explained. It is hard to imagine safe forms of disengagement until these agreements are honored, or effectively replaced. So long as Eastern and Central Europe is held as a satellite area, NATO will be a necessity.

Is there, however, an alternative to neutralizing Germany which we could prudently consider? Perhaps there

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is. The Russians, the Europeans and everyone else have a common interest in preventing the possibility of a new Bismarck, a new Wilhelm II, or a new Hitler taking over the machinery of power in a strong, unified German Reich. We should sympathetically recognize the legitimate security interest of the Soviet Union in this specter. The prevention of such a risk is one of the great goals of the Adenauer-Monnet-de Gaulle movement for European union, which is now making such heartening progress, despite all the obstacles of historical inertia opposing it. The European movement could also be the vehicle for stabilizing the struggle for power between the Soviet Union and the Anglo-American alliance, especially in Europe, Africa and the Middle East. If in the long run some form of British participation in it could be developed, it would gain in strength, and could never be dominated by Germany. It could create a field of magnetic force within which the Arab and Negro states of Africa could find a safe source of capital and of technique. And it would provide a new and vital rallying point for the idealism and hope of the peoples of Europe.

ARE there not elements here out of which an agreed European approach to the German question could emerge, perhaps at the initiative of the Germans and the Poles?

We must be polite but firm in negotiation. And we must unwaveringly back our NATO allies in every reasonable way. But the Germans and the Poles have it in their power to propose solutions which neither we nor the Russians could readily resist. The Germans and the Poles have a profound interest in common—that of getting the Russians out of East Germany. By reaching a face-saving compromise on their frontier, they could release a series of pressures which even the Russians could hardly ignore.

If we go back to the Teheran Conference, we find the Western allies and the Soviet Union united in another view of the constitutional structure of Germany, which is after all a modern invention, dating from 1871. The Teheran idea of separate German states in limbo, established as a punitive measure at the end of World War II, proved untenable. It would be quite another matter, however, if several German states, perhaps linked in a loose federation, were to be free and equal members of a European political union, protected by its common strength against the danger of Communist subversion. Such a policy could do much to end the latent and universal fear of German aggression. And it could palliate and gloss over the Soviet retreat inevitably involved in abandoning its present position in East Germany.

Such an approach to the German question would strike powerful echoing chords throughout Germany and Europe. The necessity of carrying it out would accelerate the political development of Europe as an entity. Throughout the world, this view would be greeted as a creative and promising line of foreign policy, threatening no one, but offering many peoples an improved chance to develop their futures in peace.

There are a variety of ways in which the task could be done—with or without demilitarizing Berlin and Eastern Germany, for example. The essence of the thought is that Berlin and East Germany become part of the European community which is slowly crystallizing around its new economic and political institutions. As General de Gaulle said 10 years ago, a truly European solution of the German question would permit Germany, "for all her misfortunes, to find her real role and her real greatness." That solution would posit not the form and spirit of a Reich, but "the traditional form of a Federation of States, which could take their place in a European Union without frightening anyone."

It should be stressed that the new European institutions have several forms, and involve different groupings of countries. Not all those allied through NATO are members of the Coal and Steel Community, the Common Market Treaty or Euratom. Enforcement of the Potsdam agreement in Eastern Europe need not result in adding the Soviet satellites to NATO. If they achieve political freedom, they could participate in the economic and political institutions of Europe, adding to their cohesiveness and influence, without necessarily joining the wider international grouping which now assures the military defense of Western Europe. In some such patterns, a cautious process of *de facto* disengagement could take place, leading inevitably to considerable disarmament in the process, nor is a development of this kind utterly beyond the realm of possibility. Another satellite uprising, like that of Hungary, must be a disturbing prospect to the Russians. Surely no one can guarantee that such an event would pass again without direct involvement by the West.

If the Russians, confident of their strength, are unwilling to abandon East Germany as they abandoned Austria, there is no hope at this time for a German solution we could accept, although there are doubtless formulae for continuing the *status quo* in Berlin itself which could be agreed upon. If, however, they are ready, as they apparently were for a moment at the Summit Conference, to settle the German question, the "European" approach to the future of Germany offers the most promising road to peace on this front.

Such a formulation of Allied purpose, if it could be achieved, would serve another goal. The risks of war have not been so serious since the middle thirties. If our people, and the peoples of the world, are to face such perils again, they should be certain that our government has exhausted every fair chance of accommodation, and that its policy reflects the highest and most humane aspirations of Western culture.

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BOOKS & COMMENT

The Anatomy of Adventure

by R. A. Scott-James

"I HAVE BEEN after an adventure all my life," wrote Robert Louis Stevenson, "a fine dispassionate adventure." He was one of those who could make an adventure out of anything—travelling with a donkey in the Cevennes, or constructing a road in Samoa, or vicariously in the hazards and triumphs of his fictitious heroes. But adventure in so broad a field is too immense a theme even for so courageous an inquirer as Mr. Wilfrid Noyce. Would not his book become nothing less than a History of Human Endeavor? He wisely decided to limit his subject, cutting out the ardors of intellectual adventure — "those Himalayas of the mind," as Day Lewis called them—and confining himself to the physical enterprise in which human bodies are involved; even so, it becomes apparent that this too calls upon the spirit of the adventurer and demands qualities intellectual, moral and imaginative. An adventure of the body, as this author conceives it, is also an adventure of the soul; if not, it does not qualify as adventure.

The Springs of Adventure, by Wilfrid Noyce (World; $4).

Mr. Noyce, it seems to me, has all the qualifications. He is himself a mountaineer of proved capacity, daring and endurance, having distinguished himself in the Everest expedition of 1953, and last year made his way through difficult ice almost to the summit of Mount Machapuchare. He is also no mean scholar and man of letters, as this book proves. Indeed it is one of the delightful features of this book that he has assembled here quotations from climbers of mountains, Polar explorers and explorers of the jungle, sailors on seas and rivers, pioneers of the air and under-water travel, and men and women who travelled curiously through deserts and the remoter regions of Asia.

Noyce has divided his subject not according to the fields of adventure, but according to the motives which have driven men to seek it in any field. But first, what does he mean by the word? Adventure has many meanings. When I was about nine years old it meant Fenimore Cooper, or Mayne Reid, or Captain Marryat—fiction—and equally the realities of Stanley's *Through the Dark Continent*, and some much-read books about the Polar seas. *The Adventures of Tom Jones* or even the *Adventures of Sherlock Holmes,* fascinating as they were a little later, never came into the same category; the novel incidents they record are not of the kind discussed by Mr. Noyce. He has consulted a dictionary, and finds that its formula covers too much to suit his purpose. "An enterprise in which hazard or risk is incurred; a novel or unexpected incident." He eliminates "hazard or risk," though in fact most of the adventures he discusses involved formidable dangers. He is content with the short phrase "a novel enterprise undertaken for its own sake." The last four words are the essence of the matter. The enterprise with which he is concerned is pursued for no ulterior purpose—not for money, though it may bring pecuniary reward; not for praise, though it may be acclaimed by all the world; not for doing good, though a Livingstone might think he was seeking to stop the slave trade; not even for science, though the ostensible object of an expedition may be to map the Antarctic and to solve geological problems.

I am not sure that he has been able to keep consistently to his definition. Much in sport comes near to satisfying it, as he admits, but he claims that "what 'adventure' has over sport is the sense of bigger things and the zest for the unknown." In saying this he is surely adding to his definition—"the sense of bigger things"—"the zest of the unknown." His adventure has acquired a mystique—involving the curiosity of the philosopher and the romantic, or the strangeness which calls upon faith. And again, in examining different motives which make men seek adventure, he is often qualifying the end which is sought, adding an element of moral or spiritual health—as if a man might play golf, for example, not for the sake of the exercise but for his digestion or his temper.

Many of the great adventures are painful in the extreme. Is it possible that these things are done "for the fun of it"? "Polar exploration is at once the cleanest and most isolated way of having a bad time which has been devised," wrote Apsley Cherry-Garrard in *The Worst Journey in the World*. "Are we masochists to enjoy such a battering, such cold, such a wind, lack of food, lack of sleep, lack of water," wrote Charles Houston in *K2 The Savage Mountain*. In the Antarctic Admiral Byrd spent four months alone at a meteorological fort in 1934, sometimes too weak to eat, often battered by "vindictive" blizzards. "I really wanted to go for the experience's sake," he had said. It was to avoid boredom that Alain Gerbault went off alone across the Atlantic "tossing like a cork on the crest of the waves and fighting for life against hurricanes." Nansen left behind "all I held dear in life" when he set off on his long voyage in the *Fram* to prove that his ship could safely ride up on the northern ice.

MR. NOYCE thinks that one of the reasons why men voluntarily choose painful and dangerous enterprises is that "it is part of the human make-up to want to 'prove' yourself, to show yourself that you can do something you thought impossible, to wear a hair-shirt." "I mean," said Henry Stanley, on the eve of his expedition to find Livingstone in central Africa, "by attention to my business, by self-denial, by indefatigable energy, to become, by this very business, my own master and that of others." Scott's biographer tells us that the greatest of his triumphs was not the conquest of the Pole but the conquest of his own highly strung nature. Nansen said that it was the old "thirst for achievement," the "craving to get beyond the limits of the known" that inspired him and his men. Richard Hillary believed that a war-time air-man could "swiftly develop his faculties to a degree it would normally take half a life-time

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to achieve." A "new vision of the world," said Saint-Exupéry, can be "won through hardship."

Danger, the "prick of peril," has thrills which lure men on to foolish and unjustifiable hazards. Saint-Exupéry found nothing to admire in a man who is "only courageous." "I understand now why Plato puts courage the lowest of the virtues. It is not made up of very fine feelings; a bit of anger, a bit of vanity, a lot more of obstinacy and a common or garden sporting pleasure." Contempt for death he thought was a sign of an impoverished soul unless its roots were "sunk deep in an acceptance of responsibility." Part of the pleasure of mountaineering lies in the skill with which dangers are minimized.

"The joy of climbing," says Winthrop Young, "is the joy of physical self-expression," enhanced for many by the cooperation between climbers and the "sense of good company." For others, the lonely adventure is more rewarding.

Charles Lindbergh congratulated himself on the advantages of flying alone. "By flying alone I've gained in range, in time, in flexibility; and above all I've gained in freedom." Some climbers, the author tells us, adventuring alone, "feel closer to the nature surrounding them." "The man who has lain alone at sunset on a peak, or felt the 'fierce joy' of its lonely rock buttresses under his fingers —that man has lived deeply for a while, and returns with a queer feeling of inexplicably deeper living to the everyday round."

It is just here, I think, that the author names the thing that he has really been seeking in describing thrills experienced on mountains and in the air, in the desert and in caves, on the sea and under the sea—that "joy of physical self-expression" which involves "deeper living," and might perhaps involve wider or more exalted living. When toward the end of the book he looks for a word which will sum it all up, he has to be content with a word that does not quite satisfy him—the word "expansion." "In the pride of our humanity . . . we endeavor to add cubits to our stature"—to "expand into the world along the paths of power and pleasure and curiosity."

From "Operation Candor" to "Operation Wheaties"

by Edward Posniak

IN THIS brilliant and penetrating study Walter Millis explores the history of the Cold War, from the end of World War II to mid-1957, in an attempt to elucidate the obscure interplay of civil-military elements in national policy formulation. His conclusions are not calculated to add to our complacency.

The consistent effect of the Eisenhower Administration's actions, Millis finds, has been to reduce the people's influence over the most crucial issue of military and foreign policy. It is not the public, the press and the Congress who help shape the fateful decisions of national policy. None of them "is any longer allowed to know enough about the vital data to exert much influence on the course of policies based upon them." None of them, in other words, belongs to that "elite corps of [the] totally informed . . . continuously privy . . . to basic Administration designs" to which a recent *New York Herald-Tribune* story made reference. Behind the veils of security, censorship and military secrecy, the power resides in the political appointees of the Administration the "power elite" of C. Wright Mills.

One of several examples Walter Millis quotes in support of his thesis is the inception of "massive retaliation," which he regards as by far the most fundamental policy decision of the Eisenhower Administration and which he defines as "the substitution of nuclear fire-power for men and conventional weapons, in order, to put it bluntly, to save money." It was a "civilian" decision, based on fiscal considerations and enforced by civilian bureaucrats. While they sought military advice in making it, they sought it "mainly from those military men who were prepared to agree." What is striking, as Millis points out, is that, although a "civilian" decision, it was never exposed in any meaningful way to Congressional or public debate. There was never any real discussion in Congress or in the press to reveal all the hidden implications which lie behind the decision—"not all of which were by any means apparent even to the President and his appointed civilian administrators who made it."

MILLIS illustrates how little the policymaking officials themselves understood of what they were doing by the curious history of "Operation Candor" which became "Operation Wheaties." In the final days of the Truman Administration, shortly after the world's first successful fusion device had been fired at Bikini, a State Department panel headed by Robert Oppenheimer submitted a long report to the President on the fantastically destructive potentialities of the hydrogen bomb, recommending among other things a franker public approach to the problem of nuclear weapons. This report was turned over by the Eisenhower Administration to the National Security Council for "staffing." Unfortunately, what emerged was not a broad policy for dealing with the dreadful vistas which had opened. Instead, it was proposed that C. D. Jackson, then special White House assistant in charge of psychological warfare, should go to work on "a candid Presidential speech about nuclear weapons." Jackson promptly formed a committee, named his project "Operation Candor," and began to turn out drafts for the candid Presidential speech.

What this speech was supposed to accomplish is unclear. "Perhaps, since it was placed in the hands of the psychological warfare chief," Millis observes, "it was intended to frighten our enemies and reassure our friends. If so, it would inevitably run the risk of frightening our friends and ourselves more than the enemy." Many drafts for the speech appeared, but no one particularly liked them. They were too gruesome. "It seems fair to say," Millis comments, "that the President's own purposes were obscure to him. Having based his policy directly on 'the awful consequences of nuclear warfare,' he did not want to

Arms and the State, by Walter Millis, with Harvey C. Mansfield and Harold Stein (Twentieth Century Fund; $4).

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horrify anybody by revealing the horrors implicit in the policy."

Had the speech been driven through to completion and delivery, Millis believes, it might have clarified much in the minds of the policy-makers themselves as well as in the mind of the public. But no practicable way of being candid to the American people about the policies to which the Administration had committed them was to appear. "Candor had become an inexpedient if not unusable instrument in the management of national security policy."

In August, 1953, when the Soviet Union exploded an H-bomb of its own, the problem of nuclear weapons assumed an even greater urgency. In September the President made a new suggestion to Jackson: "Suppose the United States and the Soviets were each to turn over to the United Nations for peaceful uses X kilograms of fissionable material." This was quite a new idea for the speech on which "Operation Candor" had been working. It was eagerly seized; it was "staffed" by the NSC; it became a Project; and at a White House breakfast in October it was approved by Eisenhower. Thus was born the "atoms for peace" speech delivered before the UN in December, 1953. The name assigned to this new project, because of the breakfast conference which generated it, was "Operation Wheaties"—a name, Millis points out, "singularly unfortunate, yet curiously accurate, in its symbolism."

The report of the State Department panel on the frightful gravity of the new weapons seems to have disappeared. " 'Candor,' the noble proposal to tell the truth (or at least seem to), had been replaced by 'Wheaties', connoting nothing but an advertising slogan . . . "

While Walter Millis' analysis of the metamorphosis of "Candor" into "Wheaties" is based in part on the narrative account of Robert Donovan in his *Eisenhower: The Inside Story*, in other parts of his study he has used much unpublished material, including a series of case studies undertaken as a part of this Twentieth Century Fund research project on civil-military relations. These case studies, to be published later and dealing with such crucial episodes of Cold War history as "The American Decision to Rearm Germany" and "To the Yalu and Back," should prove of compelling interest, and not only to professional historians.

In his introduction to this volume Harold Stein, the research director for this study project, quotes Santayana: "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." Today the phrase needs to be amended: In the atomic age the risk of repetition is the one risk that has been reduced.

The Home of the Phonus Balonus

by Gordon Merrick

A PUBLISHING HOUSE called Houghton Mifflin Company, which to my knowledge has hitherto done nothing notably incriminating, has now lent its imprint to a book called *Harry Vernon at Prep*. The publishers warn us: ". . . if you haven't opened a really funny book in so long that you've forgotten you can laugh so hard you cry—careful: find a safe place to collapse; cancel all appointments; then turn to page 1 of *Harry Vernon at Prep*."

Harry Vernon at Prep, by Franc Smith (Houghton Mifflin; $3).

To further whet our appetite, the author is liberally quoted as saying, among other things, that this "is one hell of a serious book; a no-quarters assault on phonus balonus," and "if there is a left-handed third baseman . . . who can't enjoy this book, a sophomore co-ed who can't, a psycho-semanticist . . . who can't, a mother of three in Newark, New Jersey who can't—then it's a failure." This has the advantage of putting the matter in a nutshell.

Nevertheless, the growing tendency among publishers to allow writers to tell their readers what they should think of their books is a dangerous one. Not long ago, James Jones was expressing unqualified admiration for something he wrote called *Some Came Running*. Vladimir Nabokov was permitted to include between the covers of *Lolita* a fond appreciation of his work. Writers are inclined to believe anything favorable they read about themselves in print. The fact that they might have written it themselves can be easily overlooked. I have no doubt that Franc Smith is under the impression that he has been enthusiastically acclaimed simply from reading his own dust jacket.

Its riches are not quickly exhausted. Franc Smith acknowledges as literary influences Aristophanes, St. Augustine, Chaucer, Mark Twain, Waugh (Evelyn? Alec?), and John Lardner. Another name will occur to anybody who bothers to read one page of the book: J. D. Salinger who wrote *The Catcher in the Rye*.

It will be remembered that Salinger chose to tell his story as a first-person narration by a sixteen-year-old school-boy, bringing extraordinary perception to bear on a coarse and primitive vocabulary to produce a fascinating mixture of comedy and pathos. In *Harry Vernon at Prep*, the narrator is a school teacher in his mid-thirties, yet the vocabulary as well as the syntax are almost identical to Salinger's. Puke, half ass, bastard, phoney are among the overworked words, along with the standard four-letter ones. The message of *Harry Vernon at Prep* is that if you speak bad English you are probably on the side of the angels and that there is more beauty in a well fielded baseball than in all the strivings of man's creative spirit.

Smith's "assault" is directed against a group of familiar if not believable fiends who teach at an expensive boy's school. Their chief sin is that they don't care for their colleague Harry Vernon, who is addicted to stealing automobiles and with whom we are assumed to feel an enormous sympathy. At least, he's a great success with the boys. He knows as many dirty words as they do. There is no plot worthy of the name, only a succession of smoking room anecdotes. Aside from our hero, the good guys are a pusillanimous bartender with a secret penchant for history, and a plain female schoolteacher who wanders onto the scene as a prospective nun and wanders off as the bride-to-be of one of the worst phonus balonuses, if that is a correct usage. I wouldn't cancel any appointments if I were you.

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MOVIES

Mother India

APARAJITO, which bears in this country the subtitle *The Unvanquished,* is the second part of a trilogy by the young Indian director, Satyajit Ray. The first part was *Pather Panchali,* and the third part is being completed now. All three films come from the novel called *Aparajito* (Harrison).

Pather Panchali by B. Bandopadyaya, but the first two films—and probably the third, too—can be seen independently. My companion at *The Unvanquished* had not seen its precursor and was not handicapped by this.

However, to one who has seen Part One, two things are now evident. The first film now seems better than it did because the second was made; and the director, Mr. Ray, is in process of creating a national film epic unlike anything—in size and soul—since the Soviet *Maxim* trilogy of 1938-1940. Further, as a record of a people's life, in its daily travail and its largest aspects, it bears comparison with Flaherty's *Nanook* and *Moana.*

For this viewer, the value of the first film was mostly along these lines, as a cultural record. The play had less interest than the by-play, the characters were not much more than acceptable types. And the story was so freighted with catastrophe that one began to balk. It is a doubtless regrettable human frailty that when excessive woe descends on one house, the spectator's sympathy palls. He suspects either that compassion is wasted on people so helpless or that the gods, if not the screenwriters, have a slight addiction to soap opera.

This question does not arise with *Aparajito* which, in addition to its documentary interest, has much greater interest as a drama than the first picture. Here sorrow, when it strikes, involves us; here, too, the story moves out of a mere struggle for existence into deeper issues that evoke more than pathos; and this gives the characters a light that shines retrospectively on the first picture. For example, I cannot now think of the mother in *Pather Panchali* only as a woman whom trouble has made a scold against her will. The tenderness and complexity of her character as revealed in the second film add dimension to her in the first.

At the end of the first part, a Hindu lay priest and his wife move with their young son from their native village to the holy city of Benares after the death of their daughter and the destruction of their house by a storm, in hope of making a fresh start. It is now 1920, and the second film finds them established in a few rooms not far from the ghat on the Ganges where the father bathes daily and reads scripture aloud for the coppers that are tossed into his bowl. He soon gets sick, insists on making his daily oblations, and dies. The widow gets a job cooking for a rich family and moves to the country with them and her son, Apu. He asks to be allowed to attend school, and there he progresses marvelously. Eventually the headmaster helps him to get a scholarship at the university in Calcutta. His mother is glad but even more she is frightened; she would prefer him to remain with her and to train for the family vocation of priesthood. But Apu, although he does not mock the past, is on fire with the future. He goes up to the teeming city, gets a part-time job at a print shop to help support himself, and plunges into the university like a rake into debauchery. His visits to his mother become more and more widely spaced. After a postponement of a visit, he arrives to find that she has died. His uncle asks him now to remain and be a priest, but Apu knows the moment and the hour; he will not even remain for the funeral rites. He says he will perform them in Calcutta, and he leaves again for the university.

"Thus equipped with poverty, pride and intelligence the Young Man from the Provinces stands outside life and seeks to enter." So Lionel Trilling has described this classic protagonist who appears and re-appears in fiction. As his Bengali embodiment, Smaran Ghosal is shy, courageous, and cruel with the necessary egotism of youth. As his mother, Karuna Banerji is altogether lovely: devoted to and afraid of her son, resigned to his gradual estrangement, and aware—with powers far outside her limited intellect—that changes are coming not only in him but in her universe.

Clearly, however, it is Ray, the director and adapter, who is carrying this project forward with the dedication of a man determined to preserve truth about his people for the people themselves and for the world: who means (to paraphrase Dedalus) to forge in the smithy of his art the uncreated conscience of his race. It is this dedication that is giving the work its increasingly heroic quality.

CLEARLY, too, Ray is learning a great deal about film-making as he progresses. The boggling of transitions, the stickiness of the obviously arty shot, these are absent from this second film. There is still a bit of difficulty with Ray's sense of timing; a few scenes are brushed off too quickly, a few dwelled on too long. But ideals of timing vary from culture to culture, and whether Ray is adhering to the standards of his country or has not yet quite mastered timing as practiced by the Western artists from whom he has learned so much else, it is impossible to say.

Some scenes—like the inconclusive episode of the Brahmin looking for a wife, like Apu's visit to the temple of the privileged monkeys—are novelistic material, discursive in a film. But on the whole, in script and in action, Ray has made the picture move, laying the lives of a few simple people so bare that he has distilled history. We await the final film, *The World of Apu,* in the expectation that it will help illuminate the shift of the future from West to East.

STANLEY KAUFFMANN


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Notes on Contributors

R. A. SCOTT-JAMES has been a prominent figure in British letters for more than fifty years. EDWARD G. POSNIAK is a consulting economist who lives in Washington, D. C. GORDON MERRICK's newest novel is *The Hot Season.*

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Correspondence

(Continued from page 3)

ago: "Comparatively few people care for art at all and most of these care for it because they mistake it for something else."

Frank Getlein's insights in "Schmeerkunst and Politics" are all sound with the exception of his final observation, too fanciful, too epigrammatic to be true. If there were any relation between political administration and art, we could just vote abstract expressionism out of office in two years along with Eisenhower as Mr. Getlein suggests; unfortunately, not even Adlai Stevenson could have had much effect on the *Art News* lobby and the hegemony of the intellectual clique that runs the modern show in America today. The problem isn't that simple, but much more serious than even Mr. Getlein realizes. That abstract expressionism is considered to be the epitome of Western art is not very surprising considering the sequence of artistic movements that have preceded it since the turn of the century. As Mr. Getlein intimates, decline and fall of the West may have been the message, but decline and fall of Western art it most surely is in practice.

The art of painting, as with the other arts, is achieved through a very difficult technical trade that has to be mastered by exceptional people. The principles of the great traditions of Western painting have been either discarded or depraved by more or less talented amateurs and Twentieth Century painters have based their "art" largely upon misapplied studio tricks that have been known for centuries. Without proper instruction and with little more to go on than some newly won artistic advances and easily misinterpreted shoptalk, it was inevitable that the painter at the turn of the century should find himself having to make do with less than the minimum it takes to make a man a painter or a painter an artist. Throughout the chaos of the war years and the unstable period between there was a succession of artistic fads that certainly expressed the imbalance of the time, but unfortunately undermined and nearly destroyed the technical traditions that seven centuries of painters have established as the basis of Western art. Artists once thought masters have been ridiculed as "academic" and traditions that have yielded generations of fine painters have been cast aside as old-fashioned. The current abstract expressionism is only the logical consequence of this artistic tailspin.

Fortunately for us there are in the background painters and their traditions still remaining, waiting for this now fifty year siege of madness to relent. Once the passion for the new and the bizarre and the "artistic" is spent, it will take years for the harm to be undone. The men who will undo it are the real painters to come, the artists with a firm grip on their trade, having assimilated our deepest thought, who will produce a truly modern art for our century and further a tradition which has been tragically neglected and abused.

DONALD S. BAIRD

Fort Smith, Arkansas

" . . . *You have no art critic*"

YOU SAY, in your controversy with Thomas Hess of *Art News*, that Mr. Getlein expresses your views, which are hostility to American abstract art. I turned to Mr. Getlein's review. He says that Gordon Washburn of the Carnegie Museum has no standards. What are Mr. Getlein's standards? He puts in a word for "proportion" and "drawing." But the trouble with this is that the worth of art is not measured by how far it exemplifies abstract qualities.

He believes in tradition. He implies that if you abstract the colors of fruits and vegetables, or paint a stripe, or hang up your bedclothes; that if you paste up torn pieces of wrapping paper, or construct out of wood strips; that if the paint is dripped, smeared, stained or wiped, the result will be frivolous. But to imply that frivolity shows in the how of art, or in the materials used, instead of in what is made, is to be oneself frivolous.

The tradition into which the American painters fit (when they are good) is the tradition of visual creativity. True creativity takes chances. Getlein says, "in the truly European painters, order, elegance and strength . . . survive in paintings with no reference to the visual world, in works by Soulages, Hartung . . . Manessier, Music and others." To this I would say that there is no such thing as a painting with no reference to the visual world. In fact, it is Rauschenberg's reference to his own bedding that infuriates Getlein. Klein refers to black and white paint and to light. Both paint and light are real things. Soulages makes something with the superficial look of the "new" painting: his strength is not strength, but self-importance. Hartung's painting comes from a mechanical draftsman's idea of tidiness. Tidiness is not order, but it relates to order as sentimentality relates to feeling. His painting comes from incomplete esthetics. The "non-objective" painters whom Getlein prefers to the Americans whom he despises, derive their work from opinions instead of from experience of life or from things. As purveyors of opinion, I can see that you find this superior. . . .

You have no art critic. Mr. Getlein does not write about his visual experience with the paintings he either likes or dislikes—his whole article could have been done from hearsay. I do not believe you are interested in the visual arts. They resist your manipulation and challenge your vanity.

FAIRFIELD PORTER

Southampton, New York

. . . *Mr. Getlein replies*

PROPORTION and drawing were cited not as standards of mine, but as standards of Mr. Washburn's predecessors, now discarded. I distinguish between a reference to bedding and the

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bedding itself. I wouldn't dream of denying the reality of paint, but, language being the poor thing it is, "reality" in art language conventionally refers to objects other than paint which the paint is so manipulated as to imitate, suggest or comment upon. Cf. *Reality*, the magazine, or "realism" in the dictionary. Also, "infuriates" and "despises" are much too strong. "Bores" and "gets impatient with" are more accurate.

As a long-time reader of Fairfield Porter's tone poems in *Art News*, I agree that our ideas as to what constitutes an art critic are irreconcilable.

FRANK GETLEIN

Milwaukee, Wis.

► *The Waist-High Culture*

SIRS:

MERLE MILLER takes you to task for having T. S. Matthews review my book, *The Waist-High Culture*. But since Miller agrees with Matthews that it is a "pretty fair book" (the phrase is Miller's, not Matthews') I think it follows that *The New Republic* safely relied on one of its former editors to write an honest review.

Miller also seems bothered that I should be Foreign News Editor of *Time* as well as the author of *The Waist-High Culture*. He calls this an "unsettling duality" in me. Those who have not read the book might be interested to know that it begins with the statement:

> I'm by origin, by impulse—and sometimes exultantly—part of that society whose trend disturbs men . . . What is wrong in America I am part of; through me (as through you) travel the currents of our culture. The battlefield is not off somewhere else, and the enemy is not something other, anonymous and massive. The terrain of struggle in my own mind. Through me passes the vulgarity of our times, and the misgivings.

I further examine this familiar American circumstance in a chapter called 'Fragmented Men." I would not think it a dishonor to Merle Miller, but only another illustration of my thesis, if thoughts of duality settled over him as he wrote movie scripts in Hollywood.

THOMAS GRIFFITH

New York, N. Y.

► *Cuban Justice*

SIRS:

IN his February 2 article on the war crimes trials in Cuba "Isn't It Clear We Have Justice?", Richard Dudman makes this comment: "The test of their fairness will come when most newsmen have gone home and the second-string defendants come before the revolutionary courts. They are the ones for whom procedural guarantees are important, the ones who may have been merely following reasonable orders." This statement would indicate that the author believes in a kind of separate justice for two groups of people charged with the same crime. There would be one form of justice for the instigators of the crime and another for those who actually perform the deed on command of their superiors. Are not both parties subject to prosecution for the same crime? If so, both parties have equal right to procedural guarantees.

DAN MACARTHUR

Chicago, Ill.

. . . Mr. Dudman replies

OF course procedural guarantees are important for everyone. My point is that press coverage of the trials of the major defendants helped the cause of justice if only by pointing out its shortcomings. In later trials, when there is little or no press coverage, that protection will not be available to the lesser defendants, where there is greater possibility of false accusation or mistaken identity.

Incidentally, in the context of normal Cuban "revolutionary justice," the major defendants were lucky to have any trial at all, considering their important roles in a police state that practiced torture, mutilation and reprisal killing.

RICHARD DUDMAN

St. Louis, Mo.

► *Is Inflation the Problem?*

SIRS:

HURRAH for Leon Keyserling! His article in *The New Republic* of February 9 'Is Inflation the Problem?' is highly persuasive. His application of the "Multiplier" principle to demonstrate that carefully allocated additional federal spending will speed up to capacity our lagging production and result in the increase of GNP and in federal revenues in substantial excess of the expenditures is clear and satisfying—up to a point.

Keyserling calls our attention to the extraordinary high profits in 1957 and 1958 of some of our national industries while operating far below full production. If Keyserling's proposals were put into effect without private business cooperation, would not these profits show such an increase at full production as would heighten the buying splurge in stocks, cause the public to divert still more of consumer spending into stock speculation and add to inflation in commodity prices resulting from such price controls, the harmful speculative craze that was our undoing in 1929? In other words, isn't there something more to be said than Keyserling allows for the present dread of inflation so long as huge business enterprises can largely fix prices? . . .

BENJAMIN H. KIZER

Spokane, Washington

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